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The Need for “Supreme” Clarity: 
Clothing, Copyright, and Conceptual 
Separability 
Jacqueline Lefebvre* 
For the first time in history, the U.S. Supreme Court will address 
copyright protection in the context of apparel in the case Star Athletica, 
LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc. This case tackles arguably the most vex-
ing, unresolved question in copyright law: How to determine whether 
artistic features of a useful article—such as a garment or piece of furni-
ture—are conceptually separable from the article and thus protectable. 
Indeed, this case comes more than sixty years after Mazer v. Stein, the 
Supreme Court’s first and, until this date, only decision in this area. A 
lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court and Congress in deter-
mining whether the artistic and utilitarian aspects of useful articles are 
conceptually separable, has resulted in a multitude of conflicting and 
effectively unreliable approaches by courts and scholars in an attempt to 
establish a standard. Given this reality, the current state of conceptual 
separability demands clarity and reform. 
This Note proposes a two-part conceptual separability test, which 
asks: (1) what are the claimed design elements of the article; and (2) can 
those design elements be identified separately from, and exist indepen-
dently of, the utilitarian features of the article?  This Note’s proposed 
test is an effective and appropriate approach for determining when a fea-
ture of a useful article is protectable under the Copyright Act for several 
reasons: focusing the conceptual separability inquiry on the article’s de-
sign elements as opposed to its utilitarian features avoids inconsistent 
                                                                                                                            
*  Senior Writing and Research Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & 
Entertainment Law Journal, Volume XXVII; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School 
of Law, 2017; B.A., Business Economics and French, University of California, Santa 
Barbara, 2012.  I would like to thank Professor Susan Scafidi for introducing me to this 
topic and the IPLJ Editorial Board and Staff for their efforts throughout the editorial 
process. 
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results; the two-part inquiry draws from language of the Copyright Of-
fice, which in turn reflects agreement between the legislative and judicial 
branches; the ordinary, reasonable observer standard is consistent with 
other aspects of copyright law; and the proposed test is practical in its 
application. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Some say that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, but fa-
shion designers may disagree. According to industry reports, fa-
shion is a global business worth more than $1.2 trillion, with over 
$250 billion spent on fashion in the United States yearly.1 Despite 
fashion’s economic and artistic contributions to our global econo-
my, American designers are provided limited intellectual property 
protection.2 Predominantly a result of emerging technologies and 
lack of intellectual property protection, knockoffs and counterfeits 
may be immediately and effortlessly produced at a much cheaper 
price point.3 As a result of a loss in sales, market share, and good 
will, unauthorized copies can effectively damage or even destroy a 
designer’s career.4 Thus, intellectual property rights are an essen-
tial component in the promotion of innovation and creativity within 
the fashion industry.5 
                                                                                                                            
1 Darrell Mottley, Intellectual Property Alert: U.S. Supreme Court Will Weigh In on Star 
Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands Inc., JD SUPRA (May 3, 2016), http:// 
www.jdsupra.com/post/contentViewerEmbed.aspx?fid=ec9e3583-2835-4016-b62b-
a46a7c1dd066 [https://perma.cc/CYH3-H97L]; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 
6, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., No. 15-866 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2016). 
2 See Christiane Schuman Campbell, Protecting Fashion Designs Through IP Law, 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/ 
protecting_fashion_designs_through_ip_law_5516.html [https://perma.cc/UG36-
S63T]. 
3 See id. 
4 See Ahlam Al Tamimi, Intellectual Property is an Enormous Asset in the Fashion 
Industry, FASHION L. (July 27, 2016), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/intellectual-
property-is-an-enormous-asset-in-the-high-fashion-industry [https://perma.cc/2RZA-
7SKR]. 
5 See id. 
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There are generally three forms of intellectual property protec-
tion for fashion designers: patents, trademarks, and copyrights.6 
Patents are typically difficult to obtain because they are expensive 
and the process is time-consuming.7 Trademarks do not actually 
protect designs, but rather protect “source identifiers” such as lo-
gos, symbols, and brand names.8 Clothing designs are traditionally 
afforded limited protection under U.S. copyright law, which pro-
tects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”9 In order to meet the originality requirement, a work 
must be independently created by its author, and possess at least 
some minimal degree of creativity.10 Clothing designs certainly fall 
within this ambit of originality, however, little protection is offered 
to clothing under copyright law because copyright protection does 
not extend to functional items.11 The only way for clothing to ac-
quire copyright protection is if the clothing article’s design ele-
ments “can be identified separately from, and are capable of exist-
ing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”12 What 
this entails has been the subject of much confusion and debate.13 
In Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., the U.S. Supreme 
Court agreed to review an August 2015 ruling by the Sixth Circuit 
to determine whether the stripes, chevrons, and color-blocking on 
cheerleading uniforms are entitled to copyright protection under 
federal law.14 This is the first time the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed copyright protection in the context of apparel. The case 
arose from a dispute between two competing manufacturers of 
                                                                                                                            
6 See Campbell, supra note 2. 
7 See Oliver Herzfeld, Protecting Fashion Designs, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2013), http:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/2013/01/03/protecting-fashion-designs/ 
#726f85d673f8 [https://perma.cc/TLL7-K5RM]. 
8 See id. 
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
10 “For example, a white [T]-shirt cannot garner copyright protection because the [T]-
shirt is a useful item with no separately artistic element.” Lori Levine, Jeffrey D. Wexler 
& Bobby Ghajar, Protecting Fashion Through Copyrights: The Supreme Court Will Decide 
Whether Cheer Uniform Designs Are Protectable, PILLSBURY L. 1 (May 11, 2016), 
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/AlertMay2016IPProtecting 
FashionThroughCopyrights.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK72-74VA]. 
11 See id. 
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
13 See Levine et al., supra note 10. 
14 Mottley, supra note 1. 
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cheerleading uniforms, in which Varsity Brands accused Star Ath-
letica of reproducing the copyrighted design elements of its cheer-
leading uniforms.15 In a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit held that the 
stripes, chevrons, zigzags, and color-blocking of a cheerleading uni-
form were eligible for copyright protection, effectively reversing 
the district court’s decision.16 The district court judge, in deter-
mining that the designs themselves were not copyrightable, ex-
plained that he could not distinguish between the creative aspects 
of the uniforms and the purpose of the uniforms themselves.17 
Although Varsity Brands involves unusual subject matter for 
the Supreme Court, the implications of this decision will resonate 
far beyond cheerleading uniforms. Star Athletica, in its petition for 
certiorari, argued that this case involved “the most vexing, unre-
solved question in copyright law: how to determine whether a fea-
ture of a useful article—such as a garment or piece of furniture—is 
conceptually separable from the article and thus protectable.”18 
The determination of separability19 has proven to be particular-
ly difficult in the context of fashion, likely due to clothing possess-
ing both functional and aesthetic attributes. Clothing serves the uti-
litarian function of protecting the body from natural elements, but 
also contains original designs that account for purely artistic prefe-
rences.20 As illustrated by cases in the Second Circuit, a court will 
first inquire whether the claimed copyrighted work is physically 
                                                                                                                            
15 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 474–75 (6th Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted in part, 136 S.Ct. 1823 (2016). 
16 See Bonnie Eslinger, 6th Circ. Leaves Cheerleader Uniform IP Protection in Place, 
LAW360 (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/712215/6th-circ-leaves-
cheerleader-uniform-ip-protection-in-place  [https://perma.cc/9V7D-XW23]. 
17 See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No. 10-2508, 2014 WL 819422, at *9 
(W.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2014), vacated, 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015). 
18 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 5. 
19 The determination of separability is a two-fold standard, which illustrates a 
philosophical quality to copyright disputes as it often deals with questions of “essence.” 
See Varsity Brands, 2014 WL 819422, at *1 (“The philosopher Plato famously discussed 
the essence of physical objects as separate from their ideal. Taking the example of a tree, 
we may well consider as a ‘tree’ a thing with only a few branches and fewer leaves, 
because it still reflects, however poorly, the ideal we inherently know to be ‘tree.’ It 
possesses tree-ness.”). 
20 See Edward F. Maluf, Why Creativity Needs IP Protection, APPAREL (Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://apparel.edgl.com/news/Why-Creativity-Needs-IP-Protection102742 [https:// 
perma.cc/9CRB-CBJT]. 
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separable from the utilitarian object such that it “can actually be 
removed from the original item and separately sold, without ad-
versely impacting the article’s functionality.”21 If the design ele-
ments are not physically separable, a court will undertake another 
inquiry into whether the elements are “conceptually separable.”22 
With no clear approach to determining whether the artistic and 
utilitarian aspects of useful articles are conceptually separable, 
courts and scholars have devised a number of ways to apply this 
standard.23 Indeed, in Varsity Brands, the Sixth Circuit argued that 
there are as many as nine existing conceptual separability tests, be-
fore formulating its own “hybrid” approach, adding to the already 
convoluted area of law.24 Consequently, the multitude of ap-
proaches have led to inconsistent results among the courts. Thus, 
by agreeing to hear the case, “the Supreme Court has the opportu-
nity to settle the law of clothing and copyright, which currently is 
anything but clear.”25 
This Note focuses on the need to harmonize copyright law by 
determining one uniform application of conceptual separability for 
all courts and scholars to follow. Part I discusses the history of cop-
yright law in the context of useful articles, the development of the 
separability standard, and the relevant statutory language of the 
Copyright Act. Part II introduces ten existing conceptual separabil-
ity tests used by courts and scholars today, explains why the exist-
ing tests are inadequate, and addresses the need for one conceptual 
                                                                                                                            
21 See Chosun Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 328–29 (2d Cir. 
2005); see also Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 
1980) (providing a classic example of a copyrightable design that satisfies the physical 
separateness requirement is an ornament that is affixed to a belt buckle that could also be 
worn separately as a pin). 
22 See Maluf, supra note 20. 
23 See generally Barton R. Keyes, Note, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate 
Surrounding Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 109 
(2008). 
24 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484–87 (6th Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted in part, 136 S.Ct. 1823 (2016). 
25 Press Release, Shiva Stella, Pub. Knowledge, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Star 
Athletica v. Varsity Brands (May 2, 2016), https://www.publicknowledge.org/press-
release/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-star-athletica-v-varsity-brands [https://perma.cc/ 
AMK9-FP3U]. 
2016] NEED FOR “SUPREME” CLARITY 149 
 
separability test. Part III proposes a new single conceptual separa-
bility test, and highlights the advantages of its application. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR 
USEFUL ARTICLES 
Before delving into the intricacies of conceptual separability, it 
is necessary to introduce some background information on copy-
right law. Section A reflects on the creation of copyright law for 
useful articles and the powers vested in Congress through the U.S. 
Constitution to create such law. Section B examines Mazer v. Stein, 
the first case involving the concept of separability in copyright. 
Section C discusses the current separability standard and the legis-
lative history leading up to its codification. 
A. Establishing Copyright Law for Useful Articles 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to enact laws 
establishing a system of copyright in the United States.26 In par-
ticular, Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power to “promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”27 Since the first federal 
copyright law in 1790, which protected books, maps, and charts, 
Congress has included some form of useful works of art in its scope 
of protection.28 It was not until 1870, however, that protection was 
extended beyond two-dimensional works of the visual arts to in-
clude, for the first time, certain three-dimensional works “intended 
to be perfected and executed as a work of the fine arts.”29 After a 
series of amendments, Congress eliminated the 1870 “fine arts” 
requirement and broadened the scope of copyright protection to 
include all “[w]orks of art; models or design for works of art” in 
                                                                                                                            
26 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1A, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE A 
BRIEF INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY, http://copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html [https:// 
perma.cc/J3ZK-D6W5] (last visited Oct. 6, 2016). 
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
28 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 26. 
29 See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909). 
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the 1909 Act.30 The broadening of copyright beyond the purely aes-
thetic thus set the stage for protecting designs of utilitarian works.31 
B. Mazer v. Stein 
In 1954, forty-five years after the enactment of the 1909 Act, 
the Supreme Court made its first and, to this date, only venture 
into the statutory and administrative ambit of copyright protection 
for useful articles when it decided Mazer v. Stein.32 At issue in Maz-
er were statuettes of male and female dancing figures “intended for 
use and used as bases for table lamps, with electric wiring, sockets 
and lamp shades attached.”33 The plaintiff, the manufacturer of the 
lamps, successfully registered the statuettes (sans lamp compo-
nents) with the U.S. Copyright Office as “works of art” under the 
Copyright Act of 1909.34 The plaintiff sold the statuettes through-
out the United States, with the majority of profits coming from 
sales of the statuette in its functional lamp assembly.35 The plaintiff 
brought suit against the defendant, a competing manufacturer, who 
copied plaintiff’s statuettes without permission and sold copies of 
the statuettes for defendant’s own lamps.36 
The issue in Mazer was presented as follows: “Can statuettes 
be protected . . . when the copyright applicant intended primarily 
to use the statuettes in the form of lamp bases . . . ?”37 The Su-
preme Court answered in the affirmative, concluding the statuettes 
were eligible for copyright protection.38 The Court explained that 
the use or intended use of the statuettes as lamp bases did not bar 
or invalidate its registration as copyrightable works of art.39 In mak-
ing its decision, the Supreme Court referred to the development of 
the Copyright Act, the legislative history of the 1909 Act, and the 
                                                                                                                            
30 See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 
(repealed 1976). 
31 See Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful 
Articles, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 339, 342 (1990). 
32 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
33 Id. at 202. 
34 See id. at 202–03. 
35 See id. at 203. 
36 See id. 
37 Id. at 204–05. 
38 See id. at 214. 
39 See id. at 218. 
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Copyright Office’s practices.40 The Court explained that the re-
moval of “fine art” in the 1909 Act eliminated any “[v]erbal dis-
tinctions between purely aesthetic articles and useful works of art,” 
and was intended “to include more than the traditional fine arts.”41 
In determining that the statuettes qualified as “works of art,” the 
Court held: 
Individual perception of the beautiful is too varied a 
power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art. . . . 
[Works of art] must be original, that is, the author’s 
tangible expression of his ideas. Such expression, 
whether meticulously delineating the model or men-
tal image or conveying the meaning by modernistic 
form or color, is copyrightable.42  
C. Codifying the Current Separability Standard 
Following the Mazer decision, the Copyright Office, at the re-
quest of Congress, evaluated the current copyright law and pro-
posed regulations to be used for a comprehensive reform of the 
1909 Copyright Act.43 In 1961, the Register of Copyrights44 issued 
his recommendations:45 The Register acknowledged the holding in 
Mazer, but still intended to not “extend the copyright law to indus-
trial designs.”46 Regarding the copyrightability of useful articles, 
the regulation stated: “If the sole intrinsic function of an article is 
its utility, the fact that the article is unique and attractively shaped 
will not qualify it as a work of art.”47 This first sentence of the reg-
                                                                                                                            
40 See Perlmutter, supra note 31, at 344. 
41 See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 211–13. 
42 Id. at 214 (citation omitted); cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 
239, 251–52 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the 
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of 
the narrowest and most obvious limits.”). 
43 See Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to 
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 717–18 (1983). 
44 The Register of Copyrights, as the director of the Copyright Office, is responsible for 
all administrative functions and duties under the Copyright Act and is authorized to 
establish regulations consistent with the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 701 (2012). 
45 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REP. OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 14–15 (Comm. 
Print 1961). 
46 Id. at 13. 
47 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960) (emphasis added). 
152           FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:143 
 
ulation was created entirely by the Copyright Office, raising a new 
issue of determining the “sole intrinsic function” of a particular 
article.48 The regulation further stated: “However if the shape of a 
utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, 
carving, or pictorial representation, which can be identified separate-
ly and are capable of existing independently as a work of art, such fea-
tures will be eligible for registration.”49 The second sentence es-
sentially paraphrased the holding in Mazer and established what 
came to be known as the separability standard. 
Congress selected particular regulations suggested by the Cop-
yright Office, including the separability standard, and codified 
them in what is now known as the Copyright Act of 1976 (the 
“1976 Act”).50 The 1976 Act, which grants copyright protection to 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression,” is the current copyright law of the United States.51 Sec-
tion 102(a) of the Act affords copyright protection to categories of 
“works of authorship,” including “pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works.”52 By replacing the term “works of art” from the 1909 
Act with the “pictorial, graphic, sculptural works” (“PGS”) cate-
gory, Congress sought to finally end copyright’s association with 
fine arts.53 Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines PGS works as “two-
dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and ap-
plied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, 
charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including archi-
tectural plans.”54 The definition continues: “Such works shall in-
clude works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not 
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.”55 The final 
part of the PGS definition draws from the language of the Copy-
right Office regulation: The design of a useful article shall be consi-
dered a PGS work “only if, and only to the extent that, such design 
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
                                                                                                                            
48 See Perlmutter, supra note 31, at 346. 
49 § 202.10(c) (emphasis added). 
50 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
51 See id. § 102. 
52 Id. 
53 See § 101. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, 
the utilitarian aspects of the article.”56 
The definition of PGS works also cross-references the defini-
tion of a “useful article.”57 It was here that Congress’s language in 
the 1976 Act was a significant deviation from the Copyright Of-
fice’s recommended regulation. Congress removed the word 
“sole” contained in the Copyright Office regulation, leaving sec-
tion 101 of the Act to define a “useful article” as “an article having 
an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the ap-
pearance of the article or to convey information.”58 This omission 
broadened the scope of “useful articles” from works that have ex-
clusive utilitarian function to those that have any utilitarian func-
tion.59 In effect, this expansion in scope actually limited the number 
of copyrightable works by subjecting more works to the separability 
standard.60 
It is common ground among courts that the language added by 
the 1976 Act was intended to differentiate creative works that enjoy 
protection from those elements of industrial design that do not.61 
Although Congress may have had a clear goal in mind, application 
of this language has presented courts with considerable difficulty.62 
Indeed, as one scholar noted: “Of the many fine lines that run 
through the Copyright Act, none is more troublesome than the line 
between protectible pictorial, graphic and sculptural works and un-
protectible [sic] utilitarian elements of industrial design.”63 Since 
the Copyright Act defines neither “identified separately” nor “ex-
isting independently,”64 the Copyright Act’s legislative history is 
                                                                                                                            
56 Id. (emphasis added). 
57 See id. 
58 Id. 
59 See Perlmutter, supra note 31, at 350. Compare § 101 (“A ‘useful article’ is an article 
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the 
article or to convey information.” (emphasis added)), with 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960) 
(“If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility the fact that the article is unique and 
attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art.” (emphasis added)). 
60 See Perlmutter, supra note 31, at 350. 
61 See Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 920–21 (7th Cir. 
2004). 
62 See id. at 921. 
63 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.5.3 (3d ed. 2005). 
64 § 101. 
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looked to for guidance. The congressional report65 explains that the 
purpose behind Congress’s language was “to draw as clear a line as 
possible between copyrightable works of applied art and non-
protectable works of industrial design.”66 The report emphasizes 
the legislature’s intent to exclude industrial design from protec-
tion: 
Although the shape of an industrial product may be 
aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Commit-
tee’s intention is not to offer it copyright protection 
under the bill. Unless the shape of an . . . industrial 
product contains some element that, physically or 
conceptually, can be identified as separable from the 
utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would 
not be copyrighted under the bill.67 
The report’s most notable reference is the potential for copy-
right protection of an element that can be conceptually identified as 
being separable from the useful article.68 This language of concep-
tual separability produced a wide variety of ways to interpret the 
separability standard. Consequently, the report’s attempt for clari-
fication may have only blurred the line between copyrightable ex-
pression and non-copyrightable utilitarian designs, thus laying out 
the inevitable demand for judicial analysis. 
II. THE INADEQUACIES OF CONCEPTUAL SEPARABILITY AS 
CURRENTLY APPLIED 
In his dissenting opinion in Varsity Brands, Judge McKeague 
made clear that a resolution for conceptual separability was 
                                                                                                                            
65 Congressional reports are the designated class of publications by which 
congressional committees report and make recommendations to the House or Senate as a 
whole. These reports concern the findings of committee hearings or the outcome of 
committee deliberations. They can contain discussions of legislative intent, a short history 
of a bill, and comparisons of current and proposed law text. Specific to this Note’s 
discussion, House Report No. 94-1476 addressed the general revision of the Copyright 
Law, title 17 of the United States Code. 
66 H.R. REP. No. 94–1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668. 
67 Id. (emphasis added). 
68 See Perlmutter, supra note 31, at 351. 
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needed.69 “The law in this area is a mess—and it has been for a 
long time,” Judge McKeague wrote.70 “The majority takes a stab 
at sorting it out, and so do I. But until we get much-needed clarifi-
cation, courts will continue to struggle and the business world will 
continue to be handicapped by the uncertainty of the law.”71 Ac-
cordingly, Section A introduces the existing conceptual separability 
tests that are currently used by courts and scholars. Section B high-
lights particular conceptual separability tests that should not be 
considered by the Supreme Court in Star Athletica v. Varsity 
Brands. Section C addresses the conflicts which arise when courts 
use multiple conceptual separability tests in their analysis. 
A. Existing Conceptual Separability Tests 
In Varsity Brands, the Sixth Circuit examined nine conceptual 
separability tests that are currently used by courts and scholars. In 
the end, the Sixth Circuit created a tenth test for determining con-
ceptual separability, adding to this already crowded and confusing 
territory of copyright law. 
1. Copyright Office’s Approach 
Under the Copyright Office’s approach to conceptual separa-
bility, the artistic features of a useful article “must be imagined 
separately and independently from the useful article without de-
stroying the basic shape of that article.”72 In other words, if the ar-
tistic features are an integral part of the overall shape or contour of 
the useful article, the features are not conceptually separable be-
cause removing the features would destroy the basic shape.73 This 
approach provides an objective basis for visualizing the artistic fea-
tures and the useful article as separate and independent works.74 
Thus, a “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature satisfies [the con-
ceptual separability] requirement only if the artistic feature and the 
                                                                                                                            
69 See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 496 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(McKeague, J., dissenting), cert. granted in part, 136 S.Ct. 1823 (2016). 
70 Id. at 496–97. 
71 Id. at 497. 
72 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES 
§ 924.2(B) (3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM III]. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
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useful article could both exist side by side and be perceived as fully 
realized, separate works—one an artistic work and the other a use-
ful article.”75 
To illustrate its analysis, the Copyright Office gives the exam-
ple of a carving on the back of a chair.76 The Copyright Office ex-
plains that the carving is conceptually separable from the chair, and 
thus copyrightable, “because one could imagine the carving . . . as a 
drawing on a piece of paper that is entirely distinct from the overall 
shape of the chair.”77 Moreover, even if the carving was removed, 
the shape of the chair would remain unchanged and would still be 
capable of serving its useful purpose.78 
2. Primary-Subsidiary Approach 
The primary-subsidiary approach79 arose out of Kieselstein-Cord 
v. Accessories by Pearl80 in 1980. The case was declared to be “on 
the razor’s edge of copyright law” as it involved drawing a “fine 
line” under applicable copyright law to determine whether belt 
buckles, a utilitarian object, could be eligible for copyright protec-
tion.81 The Second Circuit held that the primary ornamental aspect 
of the buckles was conceptually separate from the belts’ subsidiary 
utilitarian function.82 Thus, the primary-subsidiary approach al-
lows PGS features to be copyrightable when the artistic features of 
the design are “primary” to the “subsidiary utilitarian function.”83 
3. Objectively Necessary Approach 
The objectively necessary approach84 developed from Carol 
Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.85 in 1985. The Second Circuit 
held that mannequins of partial human torsos used to display ar-
                                                                                                                            
75 Id. 
76 See id. 
77 Id. 
78 See id. 
79 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016). 
80 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). 
81 Id. at 990. 
82 See id. at 993. 
83 Id. 
84 Varsity, 799 F.3d at 484. 
85 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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ticles of clothing were not copyrightable.86 The court explained 
that the mannequins were utilitarian articles that did not possess 
artistic or aesthetic features that were conceptually separable from 
their utilitarian dimension.87 The Second Circuit arrived at this ap-
proach by looking to the legislative history of the 1976 Act.88 Ap-
plying the principles found within the legislative history,89 the 
court was persuaded by the fact that the aesthetic and artistic fea-
tures of the mannequins were inseparable from the forms’ use as 
utilitarian articles.90 Moreover, “to the extent the forms possess 
aesthetically pleasing features, even when these features are consi-
dered in the aggregate, they cannot be conceptualized as existing 
independently of their utilitarian function.”91 Put another way, the 
objectively necessary approach finds that a PGS feature is concep-
tually separable if the artistic features of the design are not neces-
sary to the performance of the utilitarian function of the article.92 
4. Ordinary-Observer Approach 
The ordinary-observer approach93 stems from Judge New-
man’s dissenting opinion in Carol Barnhart.94 Judge Newman ex-
plained that for a design feature to be conceptually separable, “the 
article must stimulate in the mind of the beholder a concept that is 
separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian function.”95 
Therefore, two questions are to be asked in this analysis: (1) who is 
the beholder, and (2) when may a concept be considered sepa-
rate?96 Judge Newman believed that “the relevant beholder must 
                                                                                                                            
86 See id. at 418 
87 See id. 
88 See id. at 415. 
89 See id. at 418 (“The legislative history thus confirms that, while copyright protection 
has increasingly been extended to cover articles having a utilitarian dimension, Congress 
has explicitly refused copyright protection for works of applied art or industrial design 
which have aesthetic or artistic features that cannot be identified separately from the 
useful article.”). 
90 See id. 
91 Id. 
92 See id. at 419. 
93 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016). 
94 See Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
95 Id. 
96 See id. 
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be that most useful legal personage—the ordinary, reasonable ob-
server.”97 This “person” is the same profile used to decide many 
conceptual issues in copyright law, such as the concept of “sub-
stantial similarity.”98 Judge Newman concluded that the design 
concept is separate “only when the non-utilitarian concept can be 
entertained in the mind of the ordinary observer without at the 
same time contemplating the utilitarian function.”99 In other 
words, a PGS feature is conceptually separable if “the design 
creates in the mind of the ordinary [reasonable] observer two dif-
ferent concepts that are not inevitably entertained simultaneous-
ly.”100 
5. Design-Process Approach 
The design-process approach101 stems from Robert Denicola’s 
article, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to 
Copyright in Useful Articles.102 Professor Denicola argues that copy-
rightability “ultimately should depend on the extent to which the 
work reflects artistic expression uninhibited by functional consid-
erations.”103 In the 1987 case Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade 
Pacific Lumber Co., the Second Circuit found Denicola’s approach 
to be the best test for conceptual separability.104 The Second Cir-
cuit, in addressing its deviation from the conceptual separability 
approach used in Carol Barnhart two years prior, explained that 
perhaps the difference between the majority and the dissent in 
Carol Barnhart might have been resolved had they had Denicola’s 
article before them.105 Thus, the Second Circuit, by adopting Deni-
cola’s approach, held that a PGS feature is conceptually separable 
                                                                                                                            
97 Id. 
98 Id. For an explanation of how the “ordinary observer” personage is used in 
substantial similarity analysis, see Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 271–72 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
99 Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 423 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
100 See id. at 422. 
101 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016). 
102 Robert C. Denicola is a Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska. See generally 
Denicola, supra note 43. 
103 Id. at 741. 
104 See 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
105 See id. 
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if the “design elements can be identified as reflecting the design-
er’s artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influ-
ences.”106 
The design-process approach was revisited in the 2004 case Pi-
vot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., which in-
volved a female mannequin head named “Mara.”107 The Seventh 
Circuit reasoned that the mannequin could be conceptualized as 
existing independent from its use in hair display or make-up train-
ing because it was the product of the designer’s artistic judg-
ment.108 The designer was not constrained by any specific mea-
surements or dimensions; indeed, there was no evidence that the 
designer’s artistic judgment was constrained by functional consid-
erations.109 Rather, the designer “had carte blanche to implement 
that vision as he saw fit.”110 By contrast, this was not a situation, 
such as in Carol Barnhart, in which the mannequin features were 
included in the design for purely functional reasons.111 Thus, the 
Seventh Circuit held that because the “Mara” mannequin was 
“the product of a creative process unfettered by functional con-
cerns,” it therefore met the requirements of conceptual separabili-
ty and was eligible for copyright protection. 112 
6. Stand-Alone Approach 
The stand-alone approach113 stems from Judge Kanne’s dis-
senting opinion in Pivot Point.114 Judge Kanne proposed that when 
determining the copyrightability of a PGS feature, the important 
question to ask is “whether the features themselves are utilitarian 
aspects of the useful article.”115 In other words, under the stand-
                                                                                                                            
106 Id. 
107 372 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2004). 
108 See id. at 931. 
109 See id. 
110 Id. at 932. 
111 See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145 (“[I]n Carol Barnhart the distinctive features of the 
torsos—the accurate anatomical design and the sculpted shirts and collars—showed 
clearly the influence of functional concerns.”). 
112 Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 932. 
113 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016). 
114 See Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 934 (Kanne, J., dissenting). 
115 Id. 
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alone approach, a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature is concep-
tually separable if “the useful article’s functionality remain[s] in-
tact once the copyrightable material is separated.”116 Therefore, 
Mara’s features could not be copyrighted because taking away the 
facial features would greatly diminish or eliminate the mannequin’s 
functionality.117 
7. Likelihood-of-Marketability Approach 
The likelihood-of-marketability approach118 stems from the lan-
guage of the leading treatise in the field, Nimmer on Copyright.119 
Nimmer considers conceptual separability to exist where “there is 
any substantial likelihood that, even if the article had no utilitarian 
use, it would still be marketable to some significant segment of the 
community simply because of its aesthetic qualities.”120 In other 
words, a PGS work is considered conceptually separable from its 
utilitarian counterpart if the aesthetic element would have market 
value on its own. 
In Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., the Fifth Circuit en-
dorsed Nimmer’s approach as applied to garment designs only.121 
The basic issue in Galiano was whether casino uniforms were copy-
rightable.122 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the conceptual 
separability test is not precisely defined but found, however, that 
the likelihood-of-marketability test was the most determinative 
analysis at that time.123 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
designs were not marketable independently of their utilitarian func-
tion as casino uniforms.124 
                                                                                                                            
116 Id. 
117 See id. 
118 Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 484. 
119 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.08[B][4], 
LEXIS (database updated June 2016). 
120 Id. 
121 See 416 F.3d 411, 421 (5th Cir. 2005). 
122 See id. at 416. 
123 See id. at 421. 
124 See id. at 422. 
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8. Patry’s Approach 
Copyright expert William Patry’s approach, which claims 
“[s]eparability need not be complex or elusive,”125 relies on the 
statutory language of the Copyright Act. Accordingly, when de-
termining whether PGS features are protectable under the Copy-
right Act, Patry’s approach focuses on whether the PGS features 
are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the 
useful article.126 Patry’s approach emphasizes the fact that the fea-
tures must be capable of existing as intangible features independent 
of the utilitarian aspects of the article, not the article as a whole.127 
The 1976 Act redirected the focus away from “article” by using 
the term “aspect” which made clear that “the protected features 
need not be capable of existing apart from the article, only from its 
functional aspects.”128 
Put another way, Patry’s approach inquires whether the PGS 
features are “dictated by the form or function of the utilitarian as-
pects of the useful article.”129 If the features are dictated by the 
form or function of the utilitarian aspects of the useful article, then 
the features are not capable of existing independently of the utilita-
rian aspects.130 To the contrary, if the PGS features are not dictated 
by the form or function of the functional aspects, then the features 
can be said to be capable of existing independently, and conse-
quently are eligible for copyright.131 
9. Subjective-Objective Approach 
Under the subjective-objective approach,132 conceptual separa-
bility is determined by balancing two considerations: (1) “the de-
gree to which the designer’s subjective process is motivated by aes-
thetic concerns,” and (2) “the degree to which the design of a use-
                                                                                                                            
125 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:146, Westlaw (database updated 
Sept. 2016). 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
132 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 485 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016). 
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ful article is objectively dictated by its utilitarian function.”133 The 
first consideration requires courts to assess “the degree to which 
aesthetic concerns, as opposed to functional ones, motivate the de-
signer.”134 The second consideration focuses on whether “the de-
sign is mostly dictated by function” or “hardly dictated by function 
at all.”135 If the useful article’s design is “mostly dictated by func-
tion,” then the design elements are likely not conceptually separa-
ble from the useful article, and thus ineligible for copyright protec-
tion.136 To the contrary, if the design is “hardly dictated by func-
tion at all,” then the courts will more likely consider the PGS work 
to be copyrightable.137 
10. Sixth Circuit’s “Hybrid” Approach 
In Varsity Brands, the Sixth Circuit, after analyzing the nine 
previous conceptual separability tests, came up with its own “hybr-
id” approach, grounded in the language of the Copyright Act.138 
The Sixth Circuit found the best approach was to engage in a five-
question inquiry. The court first asks: (1) “Is the design a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work?”139 If the design is a PGS work, then 
the court next asks: (2) “[I]s it a design of a useful article,” and (3) 
“[w]hat are the utilitarian aspects of the useful article?”140 Here, 
the court gave an example of a chair, explaining that the chair is a 
useful article because it serves the utilitarian purpose of providing a 
place for a person to sit.141 Once the court has identified permissi-
ble utilitarian aspects, the court asks two final questions: (4) “Can 
the viewer of the design identify ‘pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
features’ ‘separately from… the utilitarian aspects of the useful 
article?’”142 And if so, the court asks: (5) “Can ‘the pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features’ [identified in response to question 
                                                                                                                            
133 Keyes, supra note 23, at 141. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 142. 
136 See id. 
137 Id. 
138 See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 487 (6th Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted in part, 136 S.Ct. 1823 (2016). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 See id. 
142 Id. at 488. 
2016] NEED FOR “SUPREME” CLARITY 163 
 
four] ‘exist independently of the utilitarian aspects’ [identified in 
response to question three]?”143 
The Sixth Circuit’s test is viewed as a hybrid approach because 
the court borrowed aspects from several other existing tests. For 
example, the objectively necessary approach is used to answer the 
fifth question: If the PGS features of the useful article are “not… 
required by utilitarian functions” or are “wholly unnecessary to 
performance of the utilitarian function,” then the PGS features are 
not dictated by the function of the useful article, and therefore can 
exist independently.144 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit took the de-
sign-process approach into consideration because the designer’s 
testimony may offer guidance as to which components of the de-
sign are necessary to the functionality of the useful article.145 The 
court also found the Copyright Office’s approach to be helpful in 
its analysis: Conceptual separability exists if “the artistic feature 
[of the design] and the useful article could both exist side by side 
and be perceived as fully realized, separate works—one an artistic 
work and the other a useful article.”146 In other words, if the ob-
server can imagine the PGS features of a useful article as an artistic 
work, then those features are separately identifiable and can exist 
independently. 
B. Mounting Inadequacies of Current Conceptual Separability Tests 
The existing conceptual separability tests differ in the article at 
issue and the method by which courts and scholars evaluate the 
article’s eligibility for copyright protection.147 As such, depending 
on the subject at issue, there are varying advantages and disadvan-
tages to the existing approaches. However, the overall status is 
multiple conflicting tests employed by the courts with no clear de-
finition of the conceptual separability standard.148 Not only do sev-
eral of these tests clash with each other, but some tests lack suffi-
                                                                                                                            
143 Id. 
144 Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985). 
145 See Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 488 (citing Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene 
Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 931–32 (7th Cir. 2004)). However, the Sixth Circuit did not 
endorse the design-process approach in its entirety. Id. 
146 Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 488–89 (quoting COMPENDIUM III, supra note 72). 
147 See Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 930. 
148 See supra Section II.A. 
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cient support within their own analysis. Since this Note will pro-
pose a new, single conceptual separability test as the most effec-
tive,149 it is not necessary to address and weigh the flaws of each 
individual conceptual separability test. However, there are three 
tests—the primary-subsidiary approach, the design-process ap-
proach, and the likelihood-of-marketability approach—which are 
particularly weak in their comprehension and application. Thus, 
the Supreme Court should avoid these tests in particular when 
considering the appropriate conceptual separability standard. 
To begin, the problem with the primary-subsidiary approach is 
that it offers little guidance to the trier of fact as to what is being 
measured by the classifications of “primary” and “subsidiary.” To 
illustrate this point, Judge Weinstein dissented in Kieselstein-Cord 
arguing that the majority opinion’s decision marked a distinct shift 
from prior developments in the law.150 Judge Weinstein argued: 
[C]ourts . . . have tried to follow the principle of the 
[C]opyright [A]ct permitting copyright to extend 
only to ornamental or superfluous designs contained 
within useful objects while denying it to artistically 
designed functional components of useful objects. 
Generally they have favored representational art as 
opposed to non-representation artistic forms which 
are embodied in, and part of the structure of, a use-
ful article.151 
The concerns associated with the primary-subsidiary approach 
were further addressed in the dissenting opinion of Carol Barn-
hart.152 Judge Newman, in his dissenting opinion, claimed that the 
primary-subsidiary approach “does not focus on frequency of utili-
tarian and non-utilitarian usage since the belt buckles in [the Kie-
selstein-Cord] case were frequently used to fasten belts and less of-
                                                                                                                            
149 See infra Part III. 
150 See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(Weinstein, J., dissenting). 
151 Id. 
152 See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 421–22 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
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ten used as pieces of ornamental jewelry displayed at various loca-
tions other than the waist.”153 
Additionally, the design-process approach exemplifies another 
ineffective conceptual separability test. For instance, in Brandir, 
the Second Circuit argued that Denicola’s design-process approach 
was not difficult to administer in practice.154 However, the inability 
to practically apply this approach is exactly where the design-
process approach fails. The Second Circuit claimed that the “work 
itself will continue to give ‘mute testimony’ of its origins” and that 
parties will be required to provide evidence relating to their design 
process and the nature of their work.155 However, this approach, 
which relies on the designer’s personal artistic judgment, seems 
near impossible, if not at the very least counterintuitive, to allow 
for a comprehensive, unbiased analysis of the work. 
Furthermore, Judge Kanne, in his dissenting opinion in Pivot 
Point, was of a similar position regarding the design-process ap-
proach. Judge Kanne argued that the majority opinion in Pivot Point 
bore little resemblance to the copyright statute.156 Further, he 
claimed that the “copyright statute is concerned with protecting 
only non-utilitarian features of the useful article.”157 
Finally, the likelihood-of-marketability approach has been heav-
ily criticized for its impractical application. Even the Fifth Circuit 
in Galiano was aware of the pitfalls involved when applying the li-
kelihood-of-marketability approach.158 For example, the approach 
“might unduly favor more conventional forms of art” over modern 
ideas.159 Another problem with this “market” approach is that it 
runs the risk of restricting copyright protection to only those ar-
ticles that the market demands.160 This is a hazard that even Nim-
                                                                                                                            
153 Id. at 421. 
154 See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
155 Id. 
156 See Pivot Point Int’l v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 934 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(Kanne, J., dissenting). 
157 Id. 
158 See Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 421 (5th Cir. 2005). 
159 Id. at 421 n.26. 
160 See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
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mer has acknowledged.161 Copyright restriction is at issue because 
there is likely a much wider range of people who would consider a 
sculpted form a piece of art, than there are people who are actually 
capable or willing to purchase the sculpted forms.162 
The Fifth Circuit attempted to reason that these issues were 
trade-offs it was willing to make in order to have a determinative 
rule,163 but this is a significant concern in the area of copyright. The 
court’s defense that its single-subject test aligns with other single-
subject tests is inaccurate. To illustrate, the Fifth Circuit gives the 
example of an allegedly different test for the protection of maps.164 
Yet, “[m]aps are not subject to the separability test, and in fact, the 
Fifth Circuit does not apply a different standard for protection for 
maps than for any other work.”165 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit 
claimed their approach was less problematic because it applied only 
to one art form.166 However, this singular approach may only lead 
to a plethora of tests for different types of applied art, inevitably 
creating even more confusion. 
C. The Need for One Uniform Application of Conceptual Separability 
Not only are several of the existing conceptual separability tests 
inadequate in their own capacity, but courts’ application of mul-
tiple tests has also lead to paradoxical results. The question has 
been presented: “[I]f all roads lead to Rome, then why restrict the 
conceptual separability inquiry to one test?”167 In other words, 
what is the need for one conceptual separability test if the existing 
conceptual separability tests eventually provide for the same re-
sult? The answer is simple: the choice of which test to apply is out-
come determinative.168 As Star Athletica addressed in its petition 
for certiorari, one test may result in granting copyright protection 
                                                                                                                            
161 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 119. 
162 See Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
163 See Galiano, 416 F.3d at 421. 
164 See id. at 422 n.27. 
165 2 PATRY, supra note 125, § 3:143 n.2. 
166 See Galiano, 416 F.3d at 421–22. 
167 Susan Scafidi, Dir., Fashion Law Inst., Panel Presentation at the Fashion Law 
Institute’s Sixth Annual Symposium: Fashion Planet (Apr. 22, 2016). 
168 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 27. 
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to a PGS work, while another test may not.169 Thus, there is a very 
apparent need to reexamine and harmonize the way in which we 
analyze conceptual separability. 
There is room for debate as to whether there are in fact ten dis-
tinct tests.170 However, regardless of an exact number, the use of 
more than one test has already created conflict among the courts.171 
Furthermore, as each decision in this area develops, it is likely that 
courts and scholars will continue to articulate additional tests. This 
is evidenced by the tendency of dissenting judges to propose a dif-
ferent test than what the majority adopts.172 Ultimately, a major 
concern that underlines the current state of conceptual separability 
is the fact that the numerous existing conceptual separability tests 
have created unreliable results in copyright law. 
To illustrate this issue, Star Athletica addressed two cases rele-
vant to the discussion of conceptual separability in the context of 
apparel.173 First, Star Athletica discussed Galiano v. Harrah’s Op-
erating Co., in which the Fifth Circuit considered whether a casino 
was prevented from making actual uniforms based on copyrighted 
two-dimensional sketches of the uniform.174 The Fifth Circuit used 
the likelihood-of-marketability approach, which draws from the 
language of Nimmer on Copyright,175 and limited its application to 
                                                                                                                            
169 See id. 
170 See, e.g., Tom Kjellberg, Cowan Liebowitz & Latman, P.C., Panel Presentation at the 
Fashion Law Institute’s Sixth Annual Symposium: Fashion Planet (Apr. 22, 2016) 
(“There is no circuit split. These [conceptual separability] tests are just different 
analytical frameworks.”). 
171 See Craig B. Whitney & Rachel Kronman, Debating Designs: Varsity Brands and 
Intellectual Property Protection for Fashion Designs, 24 NYSBA BRIGHT IDEAS, no. 3, Winter 
2015, at 18, 18. 
172 See, e.g., Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 496 (6th Cir. 
2015) (McKeague, J., dissenting), cert. granted in part, 136 S.Ct. 1823 (2016); Pivot Point 
Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods. Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 934 (7th Cir. 2004) (Kanne, J., 
dissenting); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1151 (2d Cir. 
1987) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. 
Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
173 See Varsity Brands, 779 F.3d at 486. 
174 See 416 F.3d 411, 413–14 (5th Cir. 2005). 
175 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 119 (stating that conceptual separability exists 
“where there is any substantial likelihood that, even if the article had no utilitarian use, it 
would still be marketable to some significant segment of the community simply because of 
its aesthetic qualities”). 
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garment designs only.176 Applying this approach to casino uni-
forms, the Fifth Circuit held that the buttons, pleats, and collars of 
the uniform were not separable because the designs were not 
“marketable independently of their utilitarian function as casino 
uniforms.”177 
In its petition for certiorari, Star Athletica claimed that Varsi-
ty’s designs would fail the likelihood-of-marketability test because 
“Varsity’s cheerleading-uniform designs are not marketable apart 
from their utilitarian function as cheerleading uniforms.”178 How-
ever, this conclusion is incorrect. To the contrary, Varsity’s copy-
righted stripes, chevrons, and zigzags could be incorporated onto 
the surface of a number of articles, such as warm-ups and gym 
bags, and therefore the two-dimensional designs are marketable for 
purposes other than that of the uniform itself.179 
Star Athletica next addressed Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fa-
shions, in which the Second Circuit determined whether the se-
quins, crystals, satin ruching, and tulle of the designer’s prom dress 
were eligible for copyright protection.180 The court applied the de-
sign-process approach, finding that the decorative elements of the 
prom dress enhanced the clothing’s decorative function.181 The 
Second Circuit agreed with the district court, which described the 
function of the prom dress as “a garment specifically meant to cov-
er the body in an attractive way for a special occasion.”182 The 
Second Circuit concluded that the designer’s prom dress was not 
eligible for copyright protection because the aesthetic aspects of 
the dress were inseparable from the functional aspects.183 Impor-
tant to note for this case in particular, however, is that the way in 
which the functionality of the prom dress was defined ultimately 
determined the outcome of the case.184 
                                                                                                                            
176 See Galiano, 416 F.3d at 421. 
177 Id. at 421–22. 
178 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 28. 
179 See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 491 (6th Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted in part, 136 S.Ct. 1823 (2016). 
180 See 500 F. App’x 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2012). 
181 See id. at 45. 
182 Id. at 44. 
183 See id. at 45. 
184 See discussion infra Section III.B.1. 
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The district court in Varsity Brands also applied the design-
process approach and held that “[a]rtistic judgment and design are 
undeniably important in this context, but they are not separable 
from the utilitarian function of the resulting garment.”185 Judge 
Cleland further stated that the utilitarian function of a cheerleading 
uniform is to “clothe the body in a way that evokes the concept of 
cheerleading.”186 As a result of the district court considering the 
function of cheerleading uniforms as identifying the wearer as a 
cheerleader and enhancing the wearer’s attractiveness, the district 
court viewed the decorative elements of cheerleading uniforms as 
intrinsically linked to, and thus inseparable from, the utilitarian as-
pects.187 
Applying a different conceptual separability approach, the 
Sixth Circuit analyzed the very same set of facts as the district 
court, and yet came to a different conclusion in Varsity Brands. In 
particular, under the third question of the Sixth Circuit’s hybrid 
test, the Sixth Circuit defined the function of a cheerleading uni-
form namely to “cover the body, wick away moisture, and with-
stand the rigors of athletic movements.”188 Thus, by using a differ-
ent definition of a garment’s functionality, the Sixth Circuit found 
that the stripes, chevrons, and zigzags were in fact conceptually 
separable from the utilitarian aspects of the cheerleading uni-
form.189 
Galiano, Jovani, and Varsity Brands are just a few examples of 
how the choice of which conceptual separability test to apply en-
tirely affects the outcome of a case. As to be expected with a multi-
tude of tests, there is a mounting frustration among courts regard-
ing the inconsistency within this area of the law.190 The dissenting 
                                                                                                                            
185 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No. 10-2508, 2014 WL 819422, at *8 
(W.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2014), vacated, 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part, 136 
S.Ct. 1823 (2016). 
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187 See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 29, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity 
Brands, Inc., No. 15-866 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2016). 
188 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 490 (6th Cir. 2015). 
189 See id. at 492. 
190 See Bill Donahue, In Cheerleader Case, Justices Could Clean Up Fashion ‘Mess,’ 
LAW360 (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/784087/in-cheerleader-case-
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170           FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:143 
 
opinion in Varsity Brands underscores this point; Judge McKeague 
explained, “the law in this area is a mess—and it has been for a 
long time.”191 Without the Supreme Court’s determination to have 
one conceptual separability test, it is very likely that courts and 
scholars will continue to devise new approaches. The accumulation 
of conceptual separability inquiries will only congest the already 
overcrowded and confusing area of copyright law. 
Furthermore, in the face of this growing inconsistency among 
copyright law, artists and creators will be deterred from generating 
new works of art, which in turn will stifle creativity and innova-
tion.192 To illustrate, there is a new generation of consumers that 
are considered a part of the “makers movement.”193 Potentially a 
result of economic shifts, activities such as crafting, “do-it-
yourself” projects, and three-dimensional printing are increasingly 
prevalent.194 However, without the proper guidance in copyright 
law, the mounting uncertainty regarding conceptual separability 
will further burden not only fashion designers, but also the growing 
industry of so-called makers who will be unsure as to how to pro-
tect their works. 
Ultimately, the clash between innovation and lack of protection 
“disrupts the balance of copyright law.”195 In an effort to protect 
themselves given this uncertainty, creators tend to make the un-
derstandable choice of over-assuming copyright protection by as-
serting overly broad copyright claims.196 This tendency effectively 
muddles the distinction between copyrightable and non-
copyrightable works, which in turn thwarts creativity and innova-
                                                                                                                            
distinct approaches have been devised over the years as the courts, in the words of the 
Sixth Circuit, have ‘struggled mightily to formulate a test’ for conceptual separability.”). 
191 Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 496–97 (McKeague, J., dissenting). 
192 See Brief of Amici Curiae Formlabs Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioner at 10, Star 
Athletica, No. 15-866 (U.S. Feb. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Formlabs Brief]. 
193 See Karen Cator, Inspiring the Next Generation of Makers, DIGITAL PROMISE (Mar. 4, 
2016), http://digitalpromise.org/2016/03/04/inspiring-the-next-generation-of-makers/ 
[https://perma.cc/CF8X-Y6L3]. 
194 See id.; see also CHRIS ANDERSON, MAKERS: THE NEW INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 13 
(2012) (“We are all Makers. . . . Knitting and sewing, scrapbooking, beading, and cross-
stitching—all Making.”). 
195 Formlabs Brief, supra note 192. 
196 See id. 
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tion.197 “Ambiguity pushes the scope of copyright protection out-
ward,” which unjustifiably stifles expression: either designers are 
inhibited from creating without interferences, or copyright holders 
are incapable of exercising their rights under conflicting rules for 
conceptual separability.198 In the end, the public is deprived of 
access to creativity.199 
III. RESOLVING THE MOST VEXING PROBLEM IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
Since the 1976 Act, there has been no guidance by the Supreme 
Court regarding conceptual separability. In fact, the last time the 
Supreme Court addressed the doctrine of conceptual separability 
was over sixty years ago in Mazer v. Stein.200 Thus, the Supreme 
Court’s decision to hear Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, and hope-
fully provide clarity on conceptual separability, comes at an imper-
ative time. Accordingly, Section A proposes a new single concep-
tual separability test for the Supreme Court to adopt. Section B ad-
dresses the advantages of this proposed test and why it will allow 
for an effective application of conceptual separability moving for-
ward. 
A. The Proposed Test for Conceptual Separability 
In essence, this Note’s proposed test for conceptual separabili-
ty is a two-part inquiry which draws upon the language of the Cop-
yright Office and refines the Sixth Circuit’s “hybrid” approach 
articulated in Varsity Brands.201 Specifically, the proposed concep-
tual separability test asks: (1) what are the claimed design elements 
of the article; and (2) can those design elements be identified sepa-
rately from, and exist independently of, the utilitarian features of 
the article? 
                                                                                                                            
197 See id. 
198 Id. at 11. 
199 See id. 
200 See supra Section I.B. 
201 See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 487 (6th Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted in part, 136 S.Ct. 1823 (2016). 
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This Note’s proposed test begins its conceptual separability 
analysis with an identification of the claimed design elements. By 
placing the design elements at the forefront of the inquiry, as op-
posed to an article’s utilitarian features, a court’s analysis follows 
the statutory language and the constitutional foundation of the 
Copyright Act.202 Under section 102(a)(5), copyright protection 
exists in PGS works, which section 101 defines as “works of artistic 
craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or uti-
litarian aspects are concerned.”203 The statute first focuses on the 
design, before articulating any useful features of the work.204 Thus, 
the claimed design is at the crux of the conceptual separability in-
quiry; the fact finder should always ask “is the claimed design pro-
tectable?”205 Indeed, it is only the creative or expressive features of 
an article that render the article original and therefore entitled to 
copyright protection in the first place.206 
Once the article’s design elements are accurately identified, the 
fact finder is better situated to analyze the aesthetic features and 
utilitarian article “side by side.”207 This leads the conceptual sepa-
rability inquiry to the second question of the proposed test: wheth-
er the claimed design elements can be “identified separately from” 
and “exist independently of” the utilitarian aspects of the ar-
ticle.208 Unlike the Sixth Circuit’s hybrid approach which makes 
two distinct inquiries on “separate identification” and “indepen-
dent existence,” this question is posed as a single inquiry.209 As an 
                                                                                                                            
202 See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in 
Support of Neither Party at 7,  Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., No. 15-866 
(U.S. July 22, 2016) [hereinafter AIPLA Brief]. 
203 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
204 See AIPLA Brief, supra note 202. 
205 Id. at 24. 
206 Id. at 7; see, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) 
(“[O]riginality is a constitutionally mandated prerequisite for copyright protection.”). 
207 COMPENDIUM III, supra note 72. 
208 Id. 
209 This single, integrated inquiry supports the Seventh Circuit and other courts that 
have concluded that “Congress, in amending the statute, intended these two phrases to 
state a single, integrated standard to determine when there is sufficient separateness 
between the utilitarian and artistic aspects of a work to justify copyright protection.” See 
Brief of Amicus Curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of 
Neither Party at 29, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., No. 15-866 (U.S. July 
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integrated inquiry, the test properly interprets the statutory 
framework set out in the Copyright Act and allows for a simple and 
practical application of the separability analysis.210 
In order for a PGS work to be copyrightable, the aesthetic fea-
tures of the article should not enhance the article’s utilitarian func-
tionality, but rather invoke in the viewer a concept that is separate 
from that of the article’s utilitarian function.211 Thus, the PGS fea-
tures are conceptually separable if the artistic features and the use-
ful article are “perceived as fully realized, separate works—one an 
artistic work and the other a useful article.”212 Courts should ana-
lyze separability of the article’s features in the eyes of an ordinary, 
reasonable observer. An ordinary, reasonable observer avoids the 
criticism directed toward Judge Newman’s dissenting opinion in 
Carol Barnhart.213 Unlike Judge Newman’s approach, which re-
quires “a complete temporal displacement of the utilitarian func-
tion by the aesthetic features,” under this proposed test, the ordi-
nary, reasonable observer who simultaneously perceives the article’s 
aesthetic features with its utilitarian function, still satisfies the con-
ceptual separability.214 The ordinary, reasonable observer is a hypo-
thetical character and thus, the fact finder deciding the case should 
also use as guidance the objective indicia of the public perception 
(such as whether the article is displayed in museums or is other-
wise presented for public viewing)215, and whether the article has 
an alternative use as a work of art apart from its utilitarian function 
(such as whether the article is displayed as a piece of art in an en-
tirely nonfunctional manner).216 
                                                                                                                            
22, 2016) (quoting Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 922 
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216 See Sahlsten, supra note 214, at 972–73. 
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Included in the second part of this inquiry is whether the PGS 
features of the article can exist independently of its utilitarian as-
pects. This inquiry relies on the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Varsity 
Brands and ultimately draws from the objectively necessary ap-
proach.217 Essentially, this part of the proposed test asks whether 
the aesthetic features of the PGS work are “wholly unnecessary to 
the performance of”218 the article’s utilitarian function. Two fac-
tors to consider when determining the necessity of the aesthetic 
features include, whether the artistic features are transferable or 
capable of existing on other articles, and whether the artistic fea-
tures are interchangeable.219 To illustrate, in Varsity Brands, the 
Sixth Circuit held that Varsity’s two-dimensional designs may be 
incorporated on the surface of different types of garments, includ-
ing shirts and practice wear.220 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit held 
that the ability of those designs to be arranged on the cheerleading 
uniforms in multiple ways was evidence that the graphic designs on 
the surface of the uniform did not affect its actual function.221 In 
fact, “nothing (save perhaps good taste) prevents” Varsity from 
printing its designs, framing them, and hanging the prints on the 
wall as art.222 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Varsity’s 
designs were “wholly unnecessary to the performance of” the 
garment’s ability to cover the body, permit free movement, and 
wick away moisture.223 
B. Advantages of the Proposed Test 
This Note’s proposed two-part analysis for determining con-
ceptual separability is an effective test because it achieves the goals 
of the copyright regime and clarifies a much-needed area of copy-
right law. The Supreme Court should adopt this Note’s two-part 
test as the appropriate approach for determining when a feature of 
                                                                                                                            
217 See discussion supra Section II.A.10. 
218 Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419. 
219 See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 491–92 (6th Cir. 
2015), cert. granted in part, 136 S.Ct. 1823 (2016). 
220 See id. at 491. 
221 See id. at 491–92. 
222 See id. at 492 (quoting Home Legend, L.L.C. v. Mannington Mills, Inc., 784 F.3d 
1404, 1413 (11th Cir. 2015)). 
223 Id. (quoting Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419). 
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a useful article is protectable under the Copyright Act because: (1) 
focusing the conceptual separability inquiry on the article’s design 
elements as opposed to its utilitarian features avoids inconsistent 
results; (2) the two-part inquiry draws from language of the Copy-
right Office, which in turn reflects agreement between the legisla-
tive and judicial branches; (3) the ordinary, reasonable observer 
standard is consistent with other aspects of copyright law; and (4) 
this Note’s proposed test is practical in its application. 
1. An Initial Consideration of Design Rather than Utility 
Avoids Inconsistent Results 
First, the proposed test refines the analysis of separability by 
focusing initially on the determination of an article’s design ele-
ments.224 In comparison, existing conceptual separability tests have 
created conflicts among courts and scholars,225 with many of these 
disputes a result of variable definitions of an article’s utilitarian 
function. For example, some believe that the inquiry of functionali-
ty is “particularly fraught in the case of clothing, whose function is 
so intimately linked with its aesthetic appeal that some courts have 
applied a presumption that anything adding to that appeal is not 
entitled to copyright protection.”226 Whether or not this is the case 
here, the mounting inconsistencies and inefficiencies among court 
decisions is a result of focusing the conceptual separability analysis 
on an article’s function. Thus, beginning the inquiry with the iden-
tification of design elements, as opposed to concentrating on utili-
tarian features, allows the fact finder to avoid such inconsistent re-
sults. 
Some have argued that analyzing an article’s design elements 
opens the door for criticism directed toward judges that may make 
aesthetic judgments, which are outside the scope of their exper-
tise.227 However, this proposed test avoids this potential for con-
                                                                                                                            
224 See supra Section III.A. 
225 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
226 Carl Mazurek, Fashion Copyright and the Muddle of the Useful Articles Doctrine, NYU 
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cern because the proposed test does not ask the fact finder to ana-
lyze the quality or degree of the design elements but rather simply 
identify the claimed design. This identification process would be 
no different than applying the same language of the Copyright Act 
to determine if a “work of craftsmanship” meets the requirements 
of originality and fixed medium.228 Unlike other conceptual separa-
bility tests, which require extrinsic facts for their analysis, courts 
can apply the same methodology as Copyright Office personnel 
when they evaluate copyright applications—i.e., on the basis of the 
application and deposit material alone.229 
2. The Proposed Test Uses Language of the Copyright Office, 
Which Is Consistent with the Legislative and Judicial 
Branches 
This Note’s proposed test draws from the language of the 
Copyright Office, which is consistent with both the Copyright Act 
and case law precedent. The proposed test therefore already re-
flects the judgment of the legislative and judicial branches. Consis-
tency in language is no mistake—the language of the Copyright Of-
fice and the Copyright Act trace its roots back to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Mazer.230 It was the Supreme Court’s decision 
that introduced the notion of conceptual separability; the regula-
tions of the Copyright Office were immediately amended to ac-
commodate the Court’s holding in Mazer; and the copyright sta-
tute now reflects the same language.231 Therefore, this Note’s pro-
posed two-part test allows for an organic and interdependent appli-
cation of a conceptual separability standard. 
Furthermore, using the Copyright Office’s very own language 
will avoid the potential of providing determinations inconsistent 
with copyright experts. Specialists in the Copyright Office analyze 
and assist in the drafting of copyright legislation, and thus the Cop-
                                                                                                                            
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and 
most obvious limits.”). 
228 See supra Section I.C. 
229 See Brief of the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Neither Party at 17, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., No. 15-
866 (U.S. July 22, 2016) [hereinafter IPLAC Brief]. 
230 See id. at 14–15. 
231 See id.; see also discussion supra Sections I.B, I.C. 
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yright Office’s opinion provides for a knowledgeable and qualified 
analysis of conceptual separability.232 As such, Congress seriously 
considers the advice of the Copyright Office when codifying regula-
tions,233 so it is beneficial for courts to respect the opinions of the 
Copyright Office. 
3. The Ordinary, Reasonable Observer Standard Is Consistent 
with Other Areas of Copyright Law 
This Note’s proposed test is advantageous because the ordi-
nary, reasonable observer standard is consistent with other aspects 
of copyright law. For example, copyright law uses the ordinary, 
reasonable observer standard to decide similar conceptual issues of 
copyright law, including whether an allegedly infringing work is 
“substantially similar” to an allegedly infringed copyrighted 
work.234 Consistency breeds uniformity, which in turn encourages 
reliability: If courts uniformly apply copyright standards, society 
may rely on an efficient and predictable court system. Thus, this 
proposed test allows for a uniform and reliable application of a con-
ceptual separability standard. 
4. The Proposed Test Is Practical in Its Application 
This Note’s proposed two-part test will be applicable not only 
to Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, but also other conceptual sepa-
rability cases moving forward. To illustrate its application, in the 
case before us, the Supreme Court would first determine the de-
sign elements of the cheerleading uniforms. The design elements 
are the two-dimensional graphic designs which are affixed to the 
uniforms—i.e., the stripes, chevrons, and color-blocking. Although 
protection and originality of these design elements is not a question 
currently before the Court, for purposes of this illustration, assume 
the design elements of Varsity’s uniforms meet the requirements 
of copyrightability.235 
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Next, the court moves to the second question of the proposed 
test: Can the graphic designs be “identified separately” and “exist 
independently” from the utilitarian aspects of the uniform? The 
Supreme Court, from the perspective of an ordinary, reasonable 
observer, could identify the stripes, chevrons, and color-blocking 
separate from the utilitarian aspects of the uniform and also find 
that the graphic designs did not enhance the uniforms’ functionali-
ty as clothing. To illustrate this identification, the Sixth Circuit 
noted that “a plain white cheerleading top and plain white skirt still 
cover the body and permit the wearer to cheer, jump, kick, and 
flip.”236 To complete its analysis, the Supreme Court would de-
termine whether Varsity’s designs “exist independently” of the 
utilitarian aspects of the cheerleading uniform. As the Sixth Circuit 
explained, it could envision Varsity “printing or painting its de-
signs, framing them, and hanging the resulting prints on the wall as 
art.”237 Thus, consistent with this analysis and drawing from the 
language of the Copyright Office, the Supreme Court can conclude 
that “a graphic design and a blank cheerleading uniform can appear 
‘side by side’—one as a graphic design, and one as a cheerleading 
uniform.”238 
To promote longevity of application and provide for overall ef-
fective copyright law, the Supreme Court should consider a single 
conceptual separability test that may be practically applied by fu-
ture courts to a variety of PGS works. To exemplify this proposed 
test’s application to other useful articles, consider a wearable tech-
nology that is designed as a bracelet but functions primarily as a 
step-counting device. If a court starts by identifying the design of 
the wearable technology, it should be clear that the design of the 
bracelet is entirely separable from the step-counting feature. In 
other words, there is no need to delve into the bracelet’s utility to 
identify the bracelet’s design. In contrast, if the court uses the 
Sixth Circuit’s hybrid approach (or any other conceptual separabil-
ity test that focuses its initial analysis on the article’s utilitarian fea-
tures), it would interrupt the inquiry by attempting to determine 
the utilitarian purpose of the device, which could very well include 
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a number of functional qualities.239 The court might therefore con-
clude that, to serve its purpose, the wearable technology must be a 
certain shape or size, and would thus mistakenly conclude the de-
sign is uncopyrightable. Therefore, to avoid such a result, and to 
allow for a uniform and practical application of the conceptual se-
parability standard moving forward, the Supreme Court should 
adopt this Note’s two-part inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
Distinguishing between copyrightable aesthetic features of a 
PGS work, and the non-protectable utilitarian aspects of an article, 
has proven to be an uncertain and effectively metaphysical task.240 
Over the years, circuit courts and scholars have approached con-
ceptual separability in a multitude of ways, without proper guid-
ance from the Supreme Court or Congress. The result is as many 
as ten existing conceptual separability tests which, when taken to-
gether, have made copyright protection of useful articles an excee-
dingly unreliable and inconsistent area of copyright law. In today’s 
economy, garments, among other useful articles, continue to blur 
the boundaries between aesthetic and functional concerns. Given 
this reality, the current state of conceptual separability demands 
clarity and reform, which the Supreme Court can finally provide in 
its decision of Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands. Thus, this Note pro-
poses a two-part test, which tailors the separability analysis to an 
article’s design elements, refers to an ordinary, reasonable observ-
er, and derives from the language of the Copyright Office, to pro-
vide for a clearer and simplified application of conceptual separabil-
ity under copyright law. 
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